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Since the notion of opportunities is still a central construct in entrepreneurship studies, 
we applaud Ramoglou and Tsang’s (2016, hereafter R&T) recent effort to engage its 
philosophical underpinnings and related theoretical and practical value. R&T ground 
their arguments in Roy Bhaskar's critical realism where a distinction is made between 
three ontological domains: the real, the actual, and the empirical. In this stratified 
ontology, it is only the entities and generative mechanisms operating in the domain of the 
real that have propensities and causal agency. Events in the domain of the actual (i.e. 
events that happen) or the empirical (i.e. events that we experience) are merely actualized 
manifestations of the empirically unobservable entities and generative mechanisms that 
continuously operate under the surface. Based on this meta-theory, R&T argue that 
opportunities exist as independent entities on the level of the real in terms of "the 
propensity of market demand to be actualized into profits” (R&T: 411). These 
opportunities-as-market-demand-propensities are then actualized, or not, as profitable 
ventures on the level of the actual. To illustrate, R&T use the analogy of a seed whose 
innate propensity to become a flower will be actualized should circumstances be right, 
but will remain unactualized should they not.  
R&T paint a very deterministic picture that downplays the many empirical and 
conceptual accounts of entrepreneurship as an open-ended and collective process that 
unfolds in real time and transforms individuals, ventures, and environments in largely 
unpredictable ways (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005a; Gartner, Bird, & Starr, 1992; Garud et 
al. 2016; McMullen & Dimov, 2013; Korsgaard, Berglund, Thrane, & Blenker, 2016). In 
fact, the analogy of a seed actualizing into a flower treats time as something that 
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influences only whether and how fast a seed becomes a flower; regardless of time passed 
the seed will never be anything but a flower. Yet time in social systems is often said to 
introduce true uncertainty, or at the very least effective unpredictability, partly by dint of 
transformative human action and interaction (Knight 1921; Lane and Maxfield, 2005). 
Stated in the terminology of critical realism, this means that any propensity existing at the 
deeper ontological level, can be manifested in a multitude of different ways at the level of 
the actual. However, since these manifestations will take place in the future, the 
connection between the opportunity-as-market-demand-propensity (on the level of the 
real) and the actualization of a profitable venture (on the level of the actual) is very 
difficult to establish since whatever profitable venture is actualized will in fact have 
depended on an unknown set of complexly interacting empirically unobservable 
generative mechanisms. We would argue that entrepreneurship concerns quintessentially 
open systems and that R&T present a needlessly and problematically deterministic view 
of the process. Indeed, even Bhaskar and other critical realists clearly acknowledge the 
challenges of establishing cause and effect in open system: “it is characteristic of open 
systems that two or more mechanisms, perhaps of radically different kinds [‘natural’, 
‘social’, ‘human’, ‘physical’, ‘chemical’, ‘aerodynamical’, ‘biological’, ‘economic’, etc], 
combine to produce effects; so that because we do not know ex ante which mechanisms 
will actually be at work (and perhaps have no knowledge of their mode of articulation) 
events are not deductively predictable” (Bhaskar 2008: 109).  
This arguably holds true both ex ante and ex post in entrepreneurship. To 
conclude from an actual event that a specific set of such mechanism existed and 
interacted to cause it, is necessarily speculative due to the tremendous complexity and 
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hence causal ambiguity involved in entrepreneurial processes. In the words of Lewis, the 
causal histories of empirical events (such as the development of a new and profitable 
venture) are typically so overwhelming that the only question is whether explanations 
need to be “infinite or merely enormous” (Lewis, 1986: 214). In addition, entrepreneurial 
processes often end up transforming the social systems in which entities and mechanisms 
are supposedly embedded, thus undermining their stability. R&T appear to acknowledge 
these difficulties in general since empirical events are said to be the result of “variously 
and complexly interacting causally powerful structures and generative mechanisms” 
(R&T: 412). However, they surprisingly maintain that in the case of entrepreneurship, 
opportunities-as-market-demand-propensities can be known to exist, ex post as well as ex 
ante, in theoretically and practically meaningful ways. 
 Besides the unsatisfactory treatment of time and uncertainty, R&T’s use of critical 
realism to save the objectivity of entrepreneurial opportunities begs the more 
fundamental questions of why it should be saved, and whether critical realism is suitable 
for the task. Critical realism is often held forth as a conceptual underlaborer or midwife 
(Bhaskar 2008) of applied work that provides value through its explicit (and according to 
its proponents true) meta-theoretical underpinnings. But how do critical realists motivate 
their bold claims about independent and ontologically real existence of causal 
mechanisms and entities operating on various levels (and by implication of opportunities-
as-market-demand-propensities)? Since such mechanisms and entities are by definition 
unobservable, critical realists tend to rely on a causal existence criterion; a view explicitly 
echoed by R&T when they state that “unactualized powers are never directly observable 
but no-less-real, and (under certain conditions) can be evidenced through their effects” 
	   5	  
(R&T: 412 emphasis added). However, such a causal criterion of existence is problematic 
when 1) mechanisms and other entities such as opportunities can have causal powers and 
propensities without exercising them, and 2) their empirical realization is obscured by 
complex interactions with other mechanisms and entities (Hedström, 2005). R&T agree 
that these conditions hold true when they write that: 
 
“propensities may remain unactualized because powers may not be triggered, and 
when triggered they need not be evident either because countervailing factors may 
constrain their empirical realization, or because additional enabling factors might 
be absent. In such occasions unobservable tendencies are said to operate 
transfactually. “ (R&T: 412). 
 
The claim to existence and causal effects of mechanisms in general, and of opportunities-
as-market-demand-propensities in particular, is thus grounded in “empirically 
unobservable effects of an empirically unobservable entity” (Hedström 2005:72). For 
both meta-theoretical and practical relevance reasons, this is clearly not satisfactory. 
However, this does not mean that all mechanism-based explanations emphasizing 
causality are unsuitable for entrepreneurship. On the contrary, the past decades have seen 
the growth of a rich literature on social mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations 
(e.g. Schelling, 1978; Elster, 1989; Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Hedström and 
Ylikoski 2010) that share with critical realists an aversion towards naïve positivism and 
constant-conjunction notions of causality, and that also seeks to explain events and 
outcomes in terms of causal mechanisms. But, where critical realists rely on a complex 
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meta-theoretical system to produce causal explanations, the social mechanisms tradition 
employs a more mundane and methodologically individualist form of mechanism-based 
explanation, emphasizing realistic descriptions of how socially embedded actors in 
interaction with one and other can bring about social phenomena (Hedström and 
Swedberg 1998). A paradigmatic example in this tradition is Merton’s self-fulfilling 
prophecy, which was originally illustrated with a bank run (Merton 1968) where the 
mechanism works as follows. A rumor of insolvency gets started, leading some 
depositors to withdraw their savings. This begins to hurt the bank, but more importantly 
signals to other depositors that the bank may be in trouble. As a result, more people 
withdraw their savings, triggering more withdrawals and so on, until the bank in fact 
becomes insolvent.  
There are important differences between these two types of mechanism-based 
explanations, one of which concerns the question of how to reduce the enormously 
complex causal histories mentioned above (Lewis 1986). Where critical realists will 
postulate the existence of unobservable entities (such as opportunities-as-market-demand-
propensities) and explain their empirical actualization (such as the development of a 
profitable new venture) as caused by a complex set of also unobservable and 
“transfactually” active mechanisms, social mechanism explanations explicitly favor 
empirically tractable accounts of how socially embedded action and interaction produce 
social outcomes. A social mechanism take on opportunities would therefore eschew an 
abstract, agent-independent, and causal notion of opportunity. Instead, explanations 
would likely focus on questions such as: how can actors with heterogeneous “opportunity 
visions” interact to produce a new organization based on a “shared opportunity vision”. 
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While not explicitly proposing a social mechanism, consider the theory of effectuation 
(Sarasvathy 2009) as an example of what such an explanation might look like. 
Effectuation describes how an entrepreneur, based on a given set of means (including a 
network of relations) and personal goals, interacts with other individuals. These 
interactions lead to some individuals joining the entrepreneurial effort, thus expanding 
the set of means but also constraining the goals in the sense that they are now jointly 
negotiated. Based on the new set of means (including an expanded network) and the new 
goals, what is now an entrepreneurial team interacts with more individuals, some of 
whom also come onboard thus further expanding the means and constraining the goals, 
and so on, until a shared “opportunity vision” stabilizes (cf. Sarasvathy and Dew 2005a).  
While we are clearly critical of R&T’s critical realist brand of causal analysis, we 
see definite potential and also some interesting challenges for entrepreneurship 
researchers who adopt the social mechanism brand of causal analysis. In general, we 
argue that the assumptions on which social mechanisms are based should be empirically 
tractable, realistic, and fit the phenomenon and explanatory purpose at hand (Hedström 
and Ylykoski 2010: 60). Here, the study of entrepreneurship might pose special 
challenges. Just as mechanisms developed by sociologists often require more nuanced 
psychological and social assumptions than is the case in more strongly methodologically 
individualistic fields, such as economics, (Hedström and Swedberg 1998), so should 
entrepreneurship scholars develop mechanisms grounded in assumptions that fit the 
actions and phenomena they seek to explain. For instance, to the extent that 
entrepreneurial processes are transformative—not only in the traditional sense of 
producing collective outcomes, but also in the sense of transforming the identities and 
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goals of the actors involved (e.g. McMullen and Dimov, 2013; Garud et al. 2016; cf. 
March 1978)— behavioral assumptions should probably include aspects of docility and 
the capacity to influence and be influenced by others (cf. Sarasvathy and Dew 2005b). 
Entrepreneurship scholars might therefore be wise to consider Gross’ (2009) suggestion 
to ground social mechanisms in conceptions of human action that explicitly go beyond 
utilitarian rational choice accounts (cf. Sarasvathy and Berglund, 2010; and Berglund, 
2015).  
 We will not go deeper into the opportunities and challenges we see in social 
mechanism-based explanations for entrepreneurship. Instead, we conclude by suggesting 
that entrepreneurship scholars pay attention to R&T’s critique of naïve positivism and 
their emphasis on mechanisms and causal explanations. However, we see no value in 
using critical realism as a meta-theoretical crutch to save the realness and independence 
of entrepreneurial opportunities, and more generally to conceive of entrepreneurial 
processes and outcomes as caused by complexly interacting and empirically unobservable 
entities and mechanisms. Instead, we urge scholars to consider explanations that focus on 
empirically tractable social mechanisms that connect social action and interaction with 
relevant outcomes in ways that take into account the open-endedness, uncertainty, and 
transformative character of entrepreneurship.  
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